Puna Geothermal Venture review and response to the element iii report, part ii : micrometeorological aerometric and health effects analysis contribution to the independent air and noise monitoring program review concerning the June 12, 13 and 14, 1991 uncontrolled venting of the Puna Geothermal Venture's KS-8 geothermal well by unknown
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PGV Response to the Element III-II Executive Summary. 
Puna Geothermal Venture (PGV) cannot accept the basic premise of the entire 
Element III-II Report, as expressed in the second sentence of the Executive Summary: 
"The purpose of this study is to provide independent verification of monitoring and 
spot measurements of ambient concentrations of hydrogen sulfide (H2S) as well as 
provide estimates of plume concentration and plume transport paths in areas where 
documented health effects occurred." PGV finds that the author of the Element III-II 
Report does !1QI provide verification of the hydrogen sulfide monitoring data. Instead, 
the measured field data is manipulated to fit the author's own model of the 
uncontrolled flow event. The estimates of plume concentration and plume transport 
presented in the Element III-II Report are principally based on the undocumented, 
randomly sampled, unsubstantiated health complaints collected. by members of the 
community, and no attempt is made to determine the statistical relevance of the 
"sampling" or any linkage to the KS-8 uncontrolled flow event. 
PGV strongly disagrees that the "independent estimates of hydrogen sulfide (H2S) 
ambient concentrations" prepared as a part of this Element III-II Report were "in 
substantial agreement with local monitoring station and mobile spot measurements 
throughout the venting period." In fact, PGV believes that the Element III-II Report 
Figures 3-1 through 3-16 show exactly the opposite (see PGV Responses F and G). 
The Element III-II Report provides absolutely no statistically-based cause-and-effect 
relationship between health complaints and ambient hydrogen sulfide concentrations to 
justify the extremely subjective "finding" that "Local H2S concentration were elevated 
above health significance levels and correlated with health complaints" (see PGV 
Response K). 
The regional wind flow analysis presented in the Element III-II Report does not 
employ a technically sound approach for estimating plume transport over the two-day 
period in question, and the author of the Element III-II Report has developed no 
statistically-based cause-and-effect relationship between the health complaints and the 
presumed ambient hydrogen sulfide concentrations (see PGV Response H). 
PGV believes the Element III-II Report "finding" that the emission of "other" air 
toxics were of significant health concern is extremely subjective and without any 
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reasonable basis for establishing a cause-and-effect relationship (see PGV 
Response K). PGV also does not agree with the "finding" that it did not utilize Best 
Available Control Technologies and did not utilize equipment described in the 
Authority to Construct (see PGV Response 0). This finding also appears to be 
beyond the scope of the Element III-II Report's stated purpose. 
Finally, the recommendations presented in the Element III-II Report are simply a 
restated presentation of the recommendations presented in the Element III-I Report, 
and have very little, if anything, to do with the KS-8 well uncontrolled flow event or 
its aftermath. See PGV Responses A through C to the Element III-I Report. 
A. Page 3, Introduction, Paragraph 2, discussion regarding emissions of hydrogen sulfide 
during the KS-8 uncontrolled flow event. 
In PGV Responses AB through AD to the Element III-I Report, PGV stated that, 
during the period prior to 06:00 on June 13 , 1991, the KS-8 well had a total flow of 
geothermal steam and fluid of between 150,000 and 200,000 lbs/hr, which contained 
an average hydrogen sulfide concentration of 440 ppmv. Thus, PGV estimates that 
from 66 to 88 lbs/hr of hydrogen sulfide were emitted during this period of the 
uncontrolled flow. Subsequent to 06:00, PGV estimates that the total flow of 
geothermal steam and fluid increased to approximately 246,000 lbs/hr, producing a 
total emission of approximately 108 lbs/hr or less of hydrogen sulfide. Although the 
flow of geothermal steam and fluid estimated by PGV are in general agreement with 
the quantity of geothermal steam only estimated by the Element III-I Report, PGV's 
estimates of hydrogen sulfide emissions are substantially lower because the 
Element III-I Report uses an incorrectly high assumption regarding the concentration 
of hydrogen sulfide in the geothermal steam and fluid (see PGV Response AB to the 
Element III-I Report). 
B. Page 3, Introduction, Paragraph 2, discussion regarding emissions of "air toxics" 
during the KS-8 uncontrolled flow event. 
In regard to the "air toxics" stated in the Element III-II Report to be emitted during 
the uncontrolled flow event, PGV does not understand the origins of, nor can it 
substantiate, the emission rates presented in Table 1-1 of the Element III-II Report. 
Based upon statements made in the Element III-I Report (page 27, paragraph 2), and 
statements made in the Element III-II Report, PGV was led to understand that the 
numbers presented Table 1-1 were based on Table 4-4 of the PGV wellfield 
application for the ATC permit. However, PGV finds that fully one-half of the 
elements or chemical compounds listed on Table 1-1 (lead, nickel, chromium, copper, 
and zinc) are not even listed on Table 4-4. For the other elements and compounds 
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which are presented in Table 4-4 of the A TC permit application, PGV does not 
understand how this information was used to calculate the numbers presented in 
Table 1-l of the Element III-II Report. Lacking sufficient information to verify the 
conclusions expressed in this paragraph in the Element III-II Report, PGV does not 
accept the validity of these conclusions; PGV simply has no idea where they came 
from. 
PGV would also point out that "copper", "zinc", "silicon oxide" and "total dissolved 
solids" listed in Table 1-l are not listed as hazardous air pollutants under the 1990 
Clean Air Act Amendments. 
C. Page 5, Study Methodology, paragraph 1, regarding the mathematical model used in 
the micrometeorological analysis. 
Mathematical models are used by atmospheric scientists and engineers to predict, or 
estimate, the concentration of an atmospheric pollutant in the ambient air once it is 
emitted from a source. These models require that certain characteristics of the 
emission source (flow rate, velocity, pollutant concentration, etc.), and certain 
characteristics regarding the meteorology (wind speed, wind direction, temperature, 
etc.) be known or assumed, then the computer will calculate the anticipated pollutant 
concentrations in the air at any specified point. Without these models, there is no 
reasonable method available to determine what happens when a pollutant is emitted 
into the air. However, all models are subject to errors which can invalidate the 
results. First, the model may be given incorrect emission or meteorological 
information to work with; incorrect emission rates or wind speeds will produce 
invalid results. Second, the model itself may not correctly reproduce actual measured 
pollutant concentrations even if given the correct source and meteorology information. 
In this case, the model may have certain limitations which prevent it from giving 
correct information in certain circumstances, or may simply be programmed 
incorrectly. The more widely used a model, the more likely its limitations are known 
and the less likely there are any undetected programming errors. 
The Micrometeorological Air Dispersion Assessment Methodology (MADAM) model 
used to estimate ambient air concentrations during the KS-8 uncontrolled flow event 
was developed by the author of the Element III-II Report. This model has 11Q.t been 
accepted .bY the EPA as a "guideline" model for use in regulatory applications, which 
raises questions as to the confidence of the modeling results presented in the 
Element III-II Report. The model's performance characteristics have not been well · 
documented for evaluation by the scientists and engineers who are trained and 
experienced in the use of such models. Appendix A of the Element III-II Report does 
not present sufficient information for verification of any of the questions arising 
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regarding the use of the MADAM model. It is unknown whether the MADAM 
model has unique limitations which may make its use in this instance inappropriate, 
nor is it known under what conditions it will fail to accurately estimate ambient 
concentrations. 
D. Page 6, Study Methodology, paragraph 2, suggested health safety limit for the general 
public. 
The Element III-II Report presents here a calculation for a "suggested health safety 
limit" for hydrogen sulfide for the general public which is insufficiently supported and 
inappropriate. The "health safety limit" which is "suggested" by the author of the 
Element III-II Report is based on the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) worker Permissible Exposure Limit (PEL) of lO ppm for 
hydrogen sulfide. OSHA PELs are time-weighted average concentrations of airborne 
contaminants to which most workers can have a daily exposure during a 40 hour work 
week for a working lifetime without suffering ill effects. As such, PELs developed 
for protecting the lon~-term (chronic) exposure of workers were not developed for the 
purpose of protecting the health of the general public from short-term (acute) 
exposures, and should not be used as the sole toxicological basis for risk assessment. 
See PGV Response H. 
It is also interesting to note that the acute (short-term) "health safety limit for the 
general public" of 24 ppb one hour average "suggested" by the Element III-II Report 
is~ the long-term California Ambient Air Quality Standard (AAQS) of 0.03 ppm 
one hour average set by the State of California to prevent nuisance effects. 
E. Page 7, paragraphs 2 through 7, and page 8, paragraphs 1 through 3, discussion 
regarding meteorological conditions during the event. 
All of the MADAM model runs were conducted with actual hourly-averaged wind 
speed and direction data from the PGV SW site, but with an assumed worse-case 
stability (Class E) and an extremely limited mixing height of 100 meters. Actual 
on-site measurements of sigma theta and wind speed ~ .!1Q! support the assumption of 
stability Class E (slightly stable conditions) for all but two hours used in the 
MADAM assessments. Instead, monitoring data for the time period involved indicate 
that the prevailing stability class was Class D (neutral, well-mixed conditions). Also, 
the 100-meter mixing height assumed by the author of the Element III-II report is 
very unlikely to occur with these well-mixed conditions. The regional meteorological 
data from the Hilo Airport also does not support the limited mixing height assumed 
by the author of the Element III-II Report. Insufficient information is available 
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regarding the MADAM model to understand how use of the correct assumptions 
would change the concentration estimated by the model. 
PGV believes that the statement made in the final paragraph of this section, that the 
"meteorological conditions during the event were not 'worst case' for air dispersion," 
is very misleading. Although the paragraph goes on to state that "wind speeds could 
have been very low or calm which would have increased proportionately the severity 
of the impacts," the frequency of occurrence of these low or calm windspeeds, and 
the "degree of proportionality," is left unstated. In fact, a quick review of the 
diagrams presented in Figure 3-1 and Figure 3-2 of the Element III-II Report show 
that the periods of calm are very infrequent, and that the low wind speeds measured 
during the early morning hours of June 14, 1991 (1.79 meters per second, or 3.88 
miles per hour) were, in fact, in the lowest of the "non-calm" windspeeds. The 
Element III-II Report presents no data to support the statement that the impacts 
measured during this uncontrolled flow event would have been significantly higher 
under different wind regimes. 
F. Page 8, local air quality impact assessment, paragraphs 1, 2, and 3, discussion 
regarding modeled air quality impact and its agreement with the measured ambient 
hydrogen sulfide concentrations. 
PGV does not agree with the statement made in the third paragraph of this section, 
that "the relationship of estimated plume position and estimated plume ground level 
H2S concentration are in agreement with the monitoring stations and the spot 
measurements." 
Figures 3-3 through 3-15 of the Report present plots of the MADAM-predicted plume 
centerline hydrogen sulfide concentrations for 13 selected hourly or multi-hour 
periods. The ambient hydrogen sulfide concentrations monitored ("observed") during 
these same time periods, consisting of a mixture of instantaneous readings from 
portable samplers and Drager tubes, as well as hourly-average readings from fixed 
monitoring stations, have been plotted based on these same figures by the author of 
the Element III-II Report in ·an effort to validate the model predictions. 
Comparing the MADAM model predictions of hourly averages to instantaneous field 
readings is inappropriate. Spot readings of up to a few minutes duration can be 
several times greater than an hourly average measured and recorded at the same 
location. For example, the PGV SW site measured and recorded instantaneous 
hydrogen sulfide concentrations on the order of 500 ppb during mid-day on June 14, 
1991, yet the hourly averages measured and recorded during the same time period 
were only 100 to 200 ppb. Unfortunately, none of the MADAM model plots were 
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prepared for those time periods when the SW site was downwind of the steam plume, 
an oversight which would have provided a much better opportunity for "validation" of 
the MADAM modeling results than the graphical representations and broad statements 
presented in the Element III-II Report. 
See also PG V Response G. 
G. Page 25, Local Impact Assessments, paragraphs 1 through 4. 
PGV does not understand how the Element III-II Report can claim that the results of 
the MADAM modelling are validated by comparisons with the spot and monitoring 
station data results. Spot measurements are frequently presented in the figures which 
are as much as an order of magnitude or more_lower than the values predicted by the 
MADAM model (such as "48 ppb" on Figure 3-5 and "92 ppb" on Figure 3-13). On 
the other hand, none of the predicted ambient concentrations come close to validating 
the high values (22 and 29 ppm) originally reported early on during the venting by 
PGV which have now been called into question (see PGV Response E to the 
Element II Report). There are D.Q measurements, either spot or from the monitoring 
stations, which validate the high hourly average hydrogen sulfide concentrations (in 
excess of 500 ppb hourly average) consistently predicted by the MADAM model in 
the plume centerline during most of the hours evaluated. Given all of the spot 
monitoring conducted by PGV and the various agencies, and all the periods during 
which the plume could have impacted impacted one or both of the monitoring stations 
during the 31-hour uncontrolled flow event, it is inconceivable to PGV that at no time 
would there be am: measurements taken of these maximum concentrations in the 
plume centerlines. Thus, PGV questions the validity of the MADAM-modeled 
results. 
In addition, it is impossible to determine or validate, on the basis of the information 
presented in the Element III-II Report, what modelling was undertaken to predict the 
ambient hydrogen sulfide concentrations shown on Figures 3-6 through 3-13 for those 
periods when geothermal resource was flowing through the choke line. It would 
appear from the way in which the lines on the figures are drawn (straight lines with 
no dispersion shown) that the lines do not represent any mathematical modeling, but 
instead were simply sketched in by the author of the Element III-II Report. 
H. Page 25, paragraphs 5 through 7, and page 26, paragraphs 1 through 4, Regional 
Impact Assessment. 
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The regional wind flow analysis presented in the Element 111-11 Report does not 
employ a technically sound approach for estimating plume transport over the two day 
period in question. 
Although it is impossible to understand with certainty the approach taken by the 
author of the Element III-II Report in estimating "plume transport" over the two day 
period in question, it is certain that this "regional wind flow analysis" does not 
employ an approach which is technically sound. It would appear that the author of 
the Element III-II Report has based his analysis of the regional plume movements 
principally on trying to match "plume movement" with the randomly sampled, 
unverified health complaints collected by members of the community. Figure 3-16 
appears to be a simple, general diagram of typical regional air flow that has ostensibly 
been "fine-tuned" by use of the frequency of health complaints. This approach is an 
entirely inappropriate use of data of limited technical basis to justify the analysis. (See 
PG V Response K.) 
Although the Element III-II Report does not specifically state, PGV assumes that the 
concentrations presented in Table 3-1 are hydrogen sulfide levels calculated by the 
MADAM model. As such, PGV believes them to be subject to the same significant 
overestimation problems discussed in PGV Responses A, B, C, E and G. 
I. Page 28, paragraphs 1 through 10, and page 29, paragraph 1, Public Health Effects. 
This section of the Element III-II Report is an inappropriate "hodge-podge" of 
complex health and toxicology data that are presented out of context and are 
incorrectly summarized. The author of the Element III-II Report continually shifts 
from statements regarding acute exposure to chronic exposure to nuisance exposure 
and back again, such that the reader is left with the impression that there are 
insignificant differences between and among them (which is completely invalid). For 
example, the author of the Element III-II Report creates a 24 ppb (34 p.g/rril) "health 
safety limit for the general public," and implies that the State of California agrees 
with this number. The referenced document referenced by the Element III-II Report 
utilizes the methodology described in the Element III-II Report (dividing the OSHA 
TL V values by 420) as a method of calculating chronic acceptable exposure levels to 
which, to quote the referenced report, "exposure below the acceptable exposure level 
(for a lifetime of 70 years, 24 hours a day) is not expected to result in adverse health 
effects." It is incorrect and inappropriate to imply that this level is to be used when 
evaluating~ exposures. What is even more inappropriate is that even the State of 
California has .!lQ! used this suggested method to calculate the acceptable chronic 
exposure level for hydrogen sulfide. 
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In the final two paragraphs of this section , the author of Element III-II Report 
purportedly quotes a definition of "public nuisance" from what he states are "various 
Civil Codes" . This is an example of a statement which is both unsupported and 
completely irrelevant to an analysis of the public health effects related to the 
uncontrolled flow event. 
J. Pages 30 through 37, Tables 4-1 through 4-3. 
Tables 4-l through 4-3 present a simplistic summary of extremely complex health 
information in a manner which is neither helpful nor relevant to the discussion of the 
KS-8 uncontrolled flow event. The information presented here is not useful in 
assessing the specific health effects of the KS-8 uncontrolled flow event. For 
example, Table 4-1 is presented as purportedly listing the "health effects of air 
pollutants often found in geothermal resources and developments." However, the 
author of the Element III-II Report makes no attempt to demonstrate that any of these 
"air pollutants" were emitted in amounts which could actually result in the levels 
identified. Moreover, many of the listed health effects are a mixture of acute and/or 
chronic health effects, which creates a further confusion in attempting to undertake 
any health assessment effort. 
K. Page 38, paragraphs l through 8, an page 39, paragraph l, community Health 
Assessment. 
The conclusions presented in the Element III-II Report are unsubstantiated and appear 
highly subjective. The author of the Element III-II Report has not established any 
statistically-based cause-and-effect relationship between public health complaints and 
measured or predicted ambient hydrogen sulfide concentrations. Instead, it would 
appear that the author of the Element III-II Report has simply accepted at face value 
the randomly sampled, unsubstantiated health complaints collected by members of the 
community, without regard to the statistical relevance of the "sampling" or any 
linkage to the KS-8 uncontrolled flow event. No true "estimates" of adverse effects 
have been derived by the author of the Element III-II Report. These "health 
complaints" were then summarily compared to the values presented in Tables 4-1 
through 4-3 to obtain health complaint "guesstimates" of the ambient concentrations, 
which were then used as a "verification" of the MADAM-modeled ambient 
concentrations. Since the MADAM-modeled ambient air concentrations for hydrogen 
sulfide have previously been shown to be extremely questionable (see PGV 
Responses A, B, C, E and G), PGV believes this underscores the questionable nature 
of the entire analysis presented in Section 4.1 of the Element III-II Report. 
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L. Page 41, Summary and Conclusions, paragraphs 1 and 2. 
PGV does not agree that the author of the Element III-II Report has successfully 
demonstrated that "individuals and families near and surrounding the site for several 
miles experiences periods where health complaints resulted from exposures to the 
released air toxics in the form of gases , aerosols and particulates (emphasis added) . " 
In addition, PGV does not agree that either the Element III-I Report or the 
Element III-II Report documented that the KS-8 uncontrolled flow event "resulted in 
hi~h emission levels of H2S and other air toxics (emphasis added)." Instead of 
attempting to develop any well-reasoned, scientific analysis of the uncontrolled flow 
event, it appears that the author of the Element III-II Report simply started with the 
assumption that these two statements were correct, then attempted to present data 
which was selected to support these assumptions. 
M. Page 41, Summary and Conclusions, Paragraphs 3 and 4, correspondence between 
measured and estimated local and regional ambient hydrogen sulfide concentrations. 
PGV disagrees that the measured and estimated {predicted by the modeling conducted 
by the author of the Element III-II Report) ambient hydrogen sulfide concentrations 
are in substantial agreement, and believes that the figures presented in the 
Element III-II Report, when interpreted without bias, verify this. PGV believes that 
the discrepancy may be, in part, a result of an over-estimation of the emission rate for 
the hydrogen sulfide (see PGV Response A, B), but may also result from the model 
used by the author of the Element III-II Report and the other inappropriate 
assumptions used in the MADAM modelling (see PGV Response C). 
N. Page 41, Summary and Conclusions, Paragraph 5, discussion of estimated impacts 
under "worst case" conditions. 
This paragraph contains statements which are totally conclusionary and completely 
unsupported by any information presented within either of the Element III Reports. 
There is no evidence whatsoever presented in the Element III-II Report, or any of the 
other Reports, which supports the statement that if the KS-8 uncontrolled venting 
would have occurred when winds were near calm or at 1.0 mph, impacts would have 
increased "an estimated 4 to 10 times." Nor is there any support whatsoever for the 
statement that under these conditions, "the distance to where health complaints were 
reported would have extended several fold." 
0. Page 41, Summary of Conclusions, Paragraphs 6, 7, and 8, conclusions regarding 
PGV operations. 
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These three paragraphs are conclusionary and unsubstantiated. 
The author of the Element III-II Report presents no evidence whatsoever to support 
the conclusion that the uncontrolled flow event was due to "lack of preparedness and 
mismanagement of techniques which could have prevented unabated H2S releases," or 
that PGV violated "ambient air quality standards for other air toxics." 
PGV has discussed the use of Best Available Control Technology for air and noise 
emissions during this uncontrolled flow event in Response AI to the Element III-I 
Report. PGV further disagrees with the statement that "the permittee has used 
equipment not described in the Authority to Construct which may have added to the 
air emissions and noise levels during the event" for which the author has provided no 
substantiation. 
This type of uncontrolled flow event was clearly discussed as a possibility in both the 
Authority to Construct permit issued by the Department of Health (Conditions 13, 17, 
and 26, for example) and in the Emergency Response Plan (ERP) approved by the 
Hawaii Civil Defense Agency (in PGV ERP Section 8.2.1 and others). 
P. Page 42, Recommendations. 
The recommendations presented in the Element III-II are simply a restated 
presentation of the recommendations presented in the Element III-I Report, and have 
very little; if anything, to do with the KS-8 well uncontrolled flow event or its 
aftermath. See PGV Responses A through C to the Element III-I Report. 
